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PROLOGUE1
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone. "It means just what I choose it to mean neither more or less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master - that's all."
Lewis Carroll
English author & mathematician (1832 - 1898)2
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INTRODUCTION

Lewis Carroll’s “Through The Looking Glass: And What Alice Found
There” introduces us to Alice’s dream induced fantasy world in her search for
passage from Victorian adolescence to adulthood. This novel, together with its
predecessor, “Alice in Wonderland,” has been analyzed by legions of
undergraduate and graduate students and their faculty who have divined
undertones as diverse as awakening sexual liberation and feminism to rebellion
from Victorian moral absolutism.3
The author’s reading of the novel and review of this commentary suggest
that Alice’s fall through the looking glass led her to a world where she is a pawn
and her every move is governed by the strict rules of a chess game. The looking
glass world is devoid of moral principle. The Red Queen rules through decree
with little regard for any logical support for her mandates. The rule of law does
not exist. The Queen’s arbitrary demands are based solely on her authority for
their justification. In this dream world, reality is a mirror image, nothing can be
trusted. The characters whom Alice meets are not real, do not show human
compassion and do not provide guidance through the chess board world. Alice is
only saved when the kindly White Knight defeats the Red Queen’s Knight and
leads her through the forest to the chess board’s eighth square where she becomes
a queen and then awakes from her dream.

3

A web search reveals hundreds of thousands of links to articles, reviews and treatises analyzing
the subject. Without attempting to list all such sources, the author would suggest that the reader
google “Through The Looking Glass” if he or she is interested in an exhaustive and exhausting
study of this issue.
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Learning disabled students in institutions of higher education, at times,
must feel as if they have fallen through the looking glass into Alice’s dream
world. Like Carroll’s Red Queen, many academic decision makers are
increasingly erecting barriers to such students’ participation in programs of higher
education based on little more than their arbitrary authority. Congress’ intent to
eliminate disability discrimination in higher education is being thwarted by
administrators who, like Humpty Dumpty, place their own meaning on words
contained in legislative mandates. The courts are increasingly abdicating their
responsibility under the doctrine of deference to those decision makers. Where are
the White Knights to lead these students back to a world in which human
compassion and moral principles trump arbitrary academic dictates? It is hoped
that the readers of this article will gain a different perspective of these issues, a
perspective based on the belief that students with learning disabilities can, and do
succeed in higher education where they are guided by White Knight
administrators rather than Red Queens.4
The right of institutions of higher education to make independent
admissions decisions has been noted to be one of the four fundamental academic
freedoms under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.5 By
enacting Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19736 ( hereafter “Section 504”)
and the Americans With Disabilities Act7 (hereafter “the ADA”), Congress also
4

My apologies for the “Through the Looking Glass” construct. I admit that it is not original and
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Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226, 106 S. Ct. 507, 88 L. Ed. 2d
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recognized that it is in the national interest to protect the rights of disabled
individuals and to ensure that those persons have the right to be judged on their
ability and not on the basis of their disabilities, real or perceived.8
The right of disabled persons to participate in higher education programs
can cause inevitable conflicts when academic decision makers weigh fundamental
program requirements against the need to modify programs to accommodate
individual disabilities. Issues of academic freedom, including the selection of
student participants, course content, testing policy and graduation requirements,
among others, may often clash with Congressional mandates which prohibit
discrimination against individuals with physical, mental or learning disabilities.
Recent court decisions demonstrate that courts give great deference to
academic decision makers, particularly where learning, cognitive or psychological
disabilities are concerned. Academic and other institutions are placing an
increasingly greater burden on students to document and prove the existence of
learning disabilities and their need for academic accommodation.9 Furthermore,
the recent trend in court decisions is to measure the extent of an individual’s
learning or cognitive disability against the academic ability of the general
population. As discussed in the following sections of this article, students with
8

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8), and § 12102(2) (2000).
See, e.g., “Guidelines for Documentation of a Learning Disability in Adolescents and Adults”
developed by an ad hoc committee of the Association on Higher Education and Learning
(AHEAD) available on the AHEAD web site at ahead@ahead.org; “Guidelines for Documentation
of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in Adolescents and Adults” developed by the
Consortium on ADHD Documentation and available from the Office of Disability Policy of the
Educational Testing Service available on the ETS web site www.ets.org; “Guidelines for
Documentation of Cognitive Disabilities” adopted by the Law School Admissions Council for
determining whether to grant accommodations on the Law School Admissions Test which is
available on its web site at www.lsac.org; and “MCAT Disability Accommodations” adopted by
the Association of American Medical Colleges for determining whether to grant accommodations
on the Medical College Admissions Test which is available on its web site at www.aamc.org.
9
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superior IQ test scores who have documented learning disabilities are being
denied academic accommodations where their intellectual capacity is equal to or
exceeds that of the general population. Those disabled students are often
prevented from succeeding in graduate level education programs where simple
accommodations, such as increased time on tests or the use of computers, could
allow them to successfully complete their programs. The current rationale of
many courts is that such students may suffer from a learning disability but they
are not “disabled” within the meaning of Section 504 and the ADA because their
impairment level still results in an academic ability which matches or exceeds the
general population as a whole, even thought the general population is incapable of
completing graduate level academic programs.
The trend toward evaluating learning disabled students by comparing
them to the population as a whole may result in many superior students being
prevented from fulfilling their educational goals and may deny disabled students
the opportunity to achieve their career potential.
This paper will review the statutory mandates of Section 504 and the ADA
and examine the extent to which courts are willing to defer to institutional
decisions concerning program modifications to accommodate learning disabled
students. Courts have long recognized that academic decision makers are entitled
to deference, especially where their decisions concern educational programmatic
issues.10 Courts must be vigilant, however, to properly weigh their role as the
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See: Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55
L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978).
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enforcers of Congressional legislation against the judicial policy of deference to
academic decisions.
Section I of this article will review the federal statutory and regulatory
framework governing disability accommodations as they relate to institutions of
higher education. Section II will address the potential conflict between essential
program requirements in higher education and compliance with federal mandates.
Section III will consider the federal courts’ deference to academic decision
makers, particularly in regard to granting or denying academic accommodations
for persons with disabilities. Finally, Section IV will examine two cases which
demonstrate the limits of the federal courts’ deference to academic decision
makers.

I.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE REHABILITATION
ACT OF 1973 AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AS
THEY APPLY TO INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
.
“There was a book lying near Alice on the table, and while
she sat watching the White King,… she turned over the
leaves, to find some part that she could read, ` -- for it's all in
some language I don't know,' she said to herself.”
“She puzzled over this for some time, but at last a bright
thought struck her. `Why, it's a Looking-glass book, of
course! And if I hold it up to a glass, the words will all go the
right way again."
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“`It seems very pretty,' she said when she had finished it, `but
it's RATHER hard to understand!' (You see she didn't like to
confess, ever to herself, that she couldn't make it out at all.)
`Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas -- only I don't
exactly know what they are!”11

A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197312 was intended to prevent
discrimination against handicapped individuals by any program which receives
federal funds.13 The Act states in part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability14
in the United States, as defined in section 7(20),
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.15
The definition of “program” includes “a college, university, or other
postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education.”16 Section 504
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Carroll, supra, Chapter I.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
13
LeStrang v. Conrail, 687 F. 2d 767 (3rd. Cir. 1982).
14
Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act as originally drafted used the term “handicapped
individual.” It was amended to substitute the term “individual with a disability”. Pub. L. No. 102569 §102(f) October 1992. The substitution was to make the terminology of the Rehabilitation Act
consistent with the Terminology of the Americans With Disabilities Act. It was not Congress’
intent to change the meaning of the Act. 138 Cong. Rec. 22900, August 11, 1992.
15
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
16
29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A) (2000), 34 C.F.R. 104.3(k)(2)(i) (2004).
12
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specifically authorizes federal agencies to issue regulations to carry out the
purpose of the Act.17
A plaintiff who wishes to establish a violation of Section 504 must prove
that she meets four elements: (1) that she is an “individual with a disability;” (2)
that she is “otherwise qualified” for participation in the program; (3) that the
program receives “federal financial assistance;” and (4) that she was “denied
benefits of” or “subject to discrimination” by the program.18
Section 504 defines the term disability as: “a physical or mental
impairment that constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment
or a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.”19
An individual with a disability is defined as: “any person who has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment.”20 The term “major life activities” is
defined in the implementing regulations as: “functions such as caring for one’s
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working.”21
Section 504 also requires that a person who brings a claim must prove that
she was subject to discrimination “solely” because of her disability. 22 A disabled
17

29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
Nathanson v. The Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1379 (3rd Cir. 1991)
; Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F2d. 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988).
19
29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (2000).
20
29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(i-iii) (2000).
21
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2004), 34 C.F.R. 104.3 (j)(2)(ii) (2004).
22
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
18
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individual cannot establish a claim under Section 504 if she is unable to meet a
facially neutral program requirement unless she “can establish that the
requirement was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.”23
Implementing regulations prohibit educational institutions that receive
federal financial aid from denying “a qualified handicapped person the
opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service.”24 A
“qualified handicapped person” with respect to post secondary or higher
education is “a handicapped person who meets the academic and technical
standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient’s education
program or activity.”25
In the admissions and recruitment of potential higher education students,
an educational institution that receives federal financial aid may not deny
handicapped persons admission to a program.26 A program may not impose limits
on the number of handicapped individuals that it may admit.27 The program
cannot use any test or criterion for admission which has a disparate impact on
such individuals.28 Furthermore, the program cannot make any preadmission
inquiry about whether the applicant suffers from a handicap.29

23

Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 32 F.3d. 718, 722 (2d. Cir. 1994); Murphy v. Franklin Pierce
Law Center, 882 F. Supp. 1176, 1180 ( U.S.D.C. N.H. 1994).
24
34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(i) (2004). As noted in FN 14, Section 504 was amended to substitute the
term “individual with a disability” for the term “handicapped individual.” Regulations issued by
various agencies may not have been amended and may still utilize the term “handicapped person.”
The author has used the terminology in the current version of the regulations in the body of this
paper.
25
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(1) (2004).
26
34 C.F.R. § 104.42(a) (2004).
27
34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(1) (2004).
28
34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(2) (2004).
29
34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(4) (2004).
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Once a handicapped student is admitted into an educational program, the
student may not be subject to discrimination. 30 The program cannot exclude any
handicapped student from “any course of study, or other part of its education
program or activity”31 and must operate its program “in the most integrate setting
appropriate.”32
The implementing regulations also require that such a program must:
make such modifications to its academic
requirements as are necessary to ensure that such
requirements do not discriminate or have the effect
of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against
a qualified handicapped applicant or student.
Academic requirements that the recipient can
demonstrate are essential to the instruction being
pursued by such student or to any directly related
licensing requirement will not be regarded as
discriminatory within the meaning of this section.
Modifications may include changes in the length of
time permitted for the completion of the degree
requirements, substitution of specific courses
required for completion of the degree requirements,
and adaptation of the manner in which specific
courses are conducted.33

Educational programs subject to Section 504 must provide methods of
evaluating a handicapped student’s performance which measure the student’s
educational achievement rather than reflect the student’s impairment.34 Programs
must also provide handicapped students with auxiliary aids which may include
taped texts, interpreters, readers for students with visual impairments, adapted

30

34 C.F.R. § 104.43(a) (2004).
34 C.F.R. § 104.43(c) (2004).
32
34 C.F.R. § 104.43(d) (2004).
33
34 C.F.R § 104.44(a) (2004).
34
34 C.F.R. § 104.44(c) (2004).
31
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classrooms for students with manual impairments and other similar services and
aids.35 Such programs, however, are not required “to provide attendants,
individually prescribed devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices
or services of a personal nature.”36

B. The Americans With Disabilities Act

In 1991, the United States Congress enacted the Americans With
Disabilities Act,37 after finding that there are over 43,000,000 persons with
disabilities living in the United States.38 Congress further found that society
tended to isolate and discriminate against these individuals in critical areas
including education.39 Congress found that, unlike those suffering from race or
sex discrimination, individuals suffering from discrimination due to physical or
mental disabilities often had no legal recourse.40 Congress determined that “the
Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency for such individuals.”41
Accordingly, Congress enacted the ADA:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;
35

34 C.F.R. § 104.44(d)(2) (2004).
34 C.F.R. § 104.44(d)(2) (2004).
37
42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (2000).
38
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000).
39
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)&(3) (2000).
40
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (2000).
41
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000).
36
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(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a
central role in enforcing the standards established in
this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities;
and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in
order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.42
The ADA is divided into five Titles. Title I concerns disability
discrimination in employment.43 Title II prohibits discrimination based on
disability in public programs, services and benefits.44 Title III prohibits
discrimination based on disability in the area of public accommodations.45 Title
IV concerns the availability of communications services to hearing and speech
impaired individuals.46 Title V contains miscellaneous provisions.47 This paper
will focus on Title II and Title III as they have been applied to accommodation
requests in institutions of higher education.
The ADA defines ‘”disability” as:
with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.48
42

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
44
42 U.C.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
45
42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000).
46
47 U.S.C. §§ 225 and 611 (2000).
47
42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2000).
48
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
43
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Title II of the ADA49 provides that:
Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.50
Title II defines “public entity” to include: “A) any State or local government; (B)
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government.”51 Title II’s prohibition against discrimination extends to
public colleges and universities.52
Pursuant to Title II a:
"qualified individual with a disability" means an
individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity.53
Title II of the ADA adopted the remedies and procedures of the
Rehabilitation Act.54 Title II authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate
regulations to implement this section, except in areas covered by the Department
of Transportation, and requires the Attorney General to make his regulations

49

42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
51
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000).
52
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(2)(i) (2004).
53
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000).
54
42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000).
50
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consistent with the regulations of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare.55
Title III of the ADA extends the prohibition of discrimination against
people with disabilities to places of public accommodation.56 A “place of public
accommodation” includes private undergraduate and post graduate educational
programs.57 Title III prohibits the use of eligibility criteria that either discriminate
or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities.58 Title III further requires:
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary
to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that
making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations.59
The Department of Justice has adopted regulations to implement
Congress’ mandate in the ADA to eliminate discrimination against disabled
individuals. Testing must be done in a manner which accurately reflects a
person’s aptitude or achievement level rather than be reflective of her disability.60
Institutions are not required to permit a disabled individual to participate in a
program if her participation would “pose a direct threat to the health or safety of
others.”61 Institutions, however, are required to make an individualized
assessment to determine whether the nature, duration and severity of the
55

42 U.S.C. § 12134 (a) & (b) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 12182 (a) (2000).
57
42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7)(J) (2000).
58
42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
59
42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
60
28 C.F.R. § 36.309 (2004), Rothberg v. LSAC, 300 F.Supp, 2d. 1093 (D.C.Col. 2004).
61
28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (2004).
56
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condition, when weighed against the potential injury and reasonable modifications
of policies which would mitigate the risk, justify exclusion of the individual from
the program.62 This issue has arisen in cases involving admissions decisions
involving individuals with communicable diseases.63
An individual claiming the ADA’s protection must also prove that she
suffers from a disability which is defined as a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual.”64
Department of Justice regulations further define disability to include: “any mental
or psychological disorder such as … specific learning disability.”65 Accordingly,
it has been held that a person who is claiming the protection of the ADA by
reason of a learning disability must present proof of a “specific learning
disability.”66
A critical issue which occurs in ADA claims in academic settings is the
issue of what constitutes a “specific learning disability.” A person who has a
diagnosis of a “learning disability” is not necessarily “disabled” as that term is
defined by the ADA.67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Betts v.
Rector and Board of Regents of the University of Virginia68 considered this issue.

62

28 C.F.R. § 36.207(c) (2004).
For example, see: School Board of Nassau Co. v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 94 L.
Ed.2d 307 (1987) in which the Supreme Court held that a school district could properly fired a
teacher who had suffered a relapse of active tuberculosis if no reasonable accommodations would
prevent her from being a danger to her students.
64
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
65
28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2) (2004).
66
Argen v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 860 F. Supp. 84, 87 (W.D. N.Y. 1994).
67
Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23105, at
p.15.
68
Betts, supra p. 1.
63
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Betts had been admitted to the University’s Medical Academic Advanced PostBaccalaureate (“MAPP”) program for economically disadvantaged or minority
students. Students who completed the program with a minimum 2.75 grade point
average were guaranteed admission to Medical School.69 Betts had a 2.2 GPA in
his first semester of the program and he continued into the second semester on
probation. He was tested for learning disabilities and was determined have
difficulty with short term memory and reading speed although he was noted to
have “average intellectual ability.”70
Betts received extra time to complete his second semester exams and
received a 3.5 grade point average. However, he had already taken some second
semester exams without accommodations which reduced his overall grade point
average to a 2.53 and he was refused admission to Medical School.71
Betts filed suit alleging a violation of Section 504 and of the ADA.
Summary judgment was granted to the University as the District Court found that
Betts was not “disabled.”72
The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, stated that the analysis of whether a person
with a learning disability was “disabled” for ADA purposes did not end with the
diagnosis of the learning disability. Courts must further determine whether the
learning disability “substantially limits one or more major life activities” as

69

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
71
Id. at 5.
72
Id. at 7.
70
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required by the ADA.73 Learning is considered a “major life activity.”74 Thus
issue was: how is “substantially limits” defined?
The ADA does not provide a definition for this term. The United States
Supreme Court has held that when Congress does not expressly define a term the
courts should “normally construe it in accord with its ordinary meaning.”75 The
Betts Court noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) issued regulations to carry out the mandate of Title I which defined the
same term. According to the EEOC, “substantially limits” means:
(i)
(ii)

Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
general population can perform the same major life activity.76

The Betts Court held that when “learning” is the “major life activity” a person
is not disabled “unless his ability is significantly restricted.”77 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that this determination required a comparison of the “learning
disability” to the learning ability of most people in the general population.78 The
Betts Court provided a specific example of such a comparison:
Student A has average intellectual capability and an
impairment (dyslexia) that limits his ability to learn
so that he can only learn as well as ten percent of the
population. His ability to learn is substantially
impaired because it is limited in comparison to most
people. Therefore, Student A has a disability for
purposes of the ADA. By contrast, Student B has
73

42. U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000); Betts, supra p. 16.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004).
75
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 124 L.Ed. 2d 138, 113 S.Ct. 2050 (1993).
76
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2004).
77
Betts, supra at 17.
78
Id. at 19.
74
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superior intellectual capability, but her impairment
(dyslexia) limits her ability so that she can learn as
well as the average person. Her dyslexia qualifies as
an impairment. However, Student B's impairment
does not substantially limit the major life function of
learning, because it does not restrict her ability to
learn as compared with most people. Therefore,
Student B is not a person with a disability for
purposes of the ADA.79
Therefore, the Court found that while Betts had a learning disability, he
was not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA because his learning ability
exceeded the learning ability of the general population.80
A similar result was reached in the case of Spychalsky v. Sullivan.81
Spychalsky had been tested for learning disabilities when he was in high school.
The testing determined that his overall intelligence was within the high average
range; his verbal ability was in the lower superior range; and that his non-verbal
ability was in the lower limits of the high average range. He also tested as high
average in abstract conceptualization and mathematic ability. The tester also
found borderline achievement on tests which measure “passive auditory
attention,” “short term memory” and “mental visual tracking.”82 The tester
concluded that the findings may indicate either a “lack of effort on the tasks” or a
“genuine deficit in attention skills.”83

79

Bettts, supra , citing, Price v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 966 F. Supp. 417 427
(S.D.W.Va. 1997).
80
Id. at 20. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the University because it found that Betts was “regarded as having an impairment” due
to the University granting testing and course accommodations to Betts.
81
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15704, p.2.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 3.
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After graduation from high school, Spychalsky attended Boston College
where he requested no accommodations. He graduated in 1995 and took the Law
School Admission Test (LSAT) without accommodations.84
Spychalsky applied for and was granted admission to St. John’s University
School of Law in 1997. Once admitted, he requested testing accommodations.85
St. John’s referred him for an additional evaluation which revealed that he tested
at the 91st percentile in overall intellectual ability which ranked in the superior
range. However, the tester noted that he had weakness in spelling which tested at
the borderline level.86
The tester recommended that Spychalsky not have spelling errors
adversely affect his grades; that professors be notified not to penalize him for
spelling errors; and that he should either type his exams with a computer with a
spell checking feature or that he be allowed to dictate his exams and have a scribe
transcribe and correct his spelling. The Law School granted these
accommodations.87 In 1998, Spychalsky requested that the Law School grant him
“time and a half” to take his exams and again the Law School granted this
accommodation.88
In October 2000, the Law School Registrar sent Spychalsky a note
indicating that he had not completed the course in Taxation which was a
requirement for graduation. Spychalsky requested a waiver of that requirement
due to his disability which “significant[ly] affect[ed] [his] ability to manipulate
84

Id.
Id at 6.
86
Id at 7.
87
Id. at 8.
88
Id. at 9.
85
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numbers.”89 Sullivan, a Dean at the Law School, denied his request because the
Taxation course was considered a core component of the curriculum.90 Her
decision was reviewed by the Dean of the Law School and by members of the
faculty who taught Taxation. The decision was also reviewed by the Director of
the University’s Counseling Center. Based on this review, Spychalsky’s request
for a waiver of the Taxation requirement was denied.91 Spychalsky then filed suit
claiming a violation of Title II of the ADA.92
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment raising the issue that
Spychalsky was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.93 The Court noted
that the United States Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Mfg. Kentucky Inc. v.
Williams94 held that merely submitting evidence of a diagnosis of a disability was
insufficient to state a claim under the ADA. Instead, claimants must offer
“evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by their impairment in terms of
their own experience is substantial.”95 The District Court then noted that
Spychalsky had failed to present evidence which indicated that his impairment
substantially limited the major life activity of learning. Spychalsky had graduated
from high school, a prestigious university and a top ranked law school.96 The
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Court further noted that Spychalsky’s testing rated him superior in overall
intellect and in the superior or high average range on most tests. The District
Court concluded that “this evidence, evaluated collectively, is insufficient to
allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Plaintiff was substantially limited
in his ability to speak.”97 The District Court held that “evidence of certain
accommodations in high school and college ‘do not suffice to establish a record
that his impairment created a substantial limitation of’ his ability to learn.”98
Accordingly, the District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.99

C. Harmonizing the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA

Some courts have held that the elements of a claim under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act are “identical” to those under the ADA.100 Other courts
have noted that Title II of the ADA was “expressly modeled” on Section 504.101
Furthermore, it has been noted that “there is no significant difference in analysis
of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act”…and that courts are required to “construe the ADA to grant at least as much
protection as provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation
Act…[b]ecause the language of the two statutes is substantially the same” and the
97
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“legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended judicial
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when
interpreting the ADA.”102
This analysis must be viewed with caution in light of the United
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Toyota Motors where the Court noted that while
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was expressly granted
regulating authority under Section 504, the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission was not granted similar authority to promulgate regulations
interpreting the term “disability” in the ADA. Accordingly the Court stated that
the persuasive authority of the EEOC regulations is “less clear.”103
One significant distinction is that under Section 504, a claimant must
prove that his disability was the “sole” reason for the alleged improper
discrimination.104 This requirement puts an increased burden on a claimant when
compared to the requirements of the ADA which only require that the disability
was a “motivating factor in the discrimination.”105
Other important distinctions in the two statutes concern the remedies
available to claimants. Section 504 provides the same remedies that are available
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”).106 While Title VI is
silent concerning the availability of a private cause of action for monetary
damages, it has been well settled that such a remedy is available for intentional

102

Id.
Toyota Motors, supra at 194.
104
29 U.S.C. §794(A) (2000), See also, Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Science Center, 280 F.3d 98,
112 (2d Cir. 2001); Amir v. Saint Louis University, 184 F.3d 1017, 1028 (8th Cir. 1999).
105
Spychalsky, supra at 19.
106
42 U.S.C. §2000e (2000).
103

22

violations of Title VI and by analogy also available under the Rehabilitation
Act107
Title II of the ADA likewise provides for monetary damages for
violations. In the case of Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett,108 however, the United States Supreme Court held that the grant of
sovereign immunity contained in Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects states from claims for monetary damages under Title I of the
ADA.109 The Supreme Court in Garrett left open the question of Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Title II and specifically noted that “we are not
disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which has somewhat
different remedial provisions from Title I, is appropriate legislation under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”110
In Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Science Center111 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, relying on Garrett, struck down claims for monetary damages against
state actors under Title II of the ADA where claims of discrimination were based
on “deliberate indifference.”112 The Garcia Court held that Title II claims for
monetary damages against state actors must be based on “proof of discriminatory
animus or ill will.”113
The Garcia Court noted that Title II claims for monetary damages against
local governmental agencies can still be brought based on a showing of
107
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“deliberate indifference” because local governmental agencies do not enjoy
Eleventh Amendment immunity.114 Furthermore, the Court held that its decision
did not bar actions against state actors under Title II which sought injunctive
relief for claims based on “deliberate indifference.”115
The United States Supreme Court examined the Eleventh Amendment
immunity issue as it applied to Title II in Tennessee v. Lane.116 In Lane, a sharply
divided Court held that Congress, in enacting Title II, appropriately exercised it
power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to waive states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity where the constitutional violation implicated the
accessibility of judicial services.117
The Supreme Court is still defining the limits of Eleventh Amendment
immunity as it applies to Title II actions. The Court recently accepted certiorari
and consolidated the cases of United States v. Georgia118 and Goodman v.
Georgia119 to determine whether a state was immune from a prisoner’s Title II
claim of discrimination due to alleged inadequately accessible prison housing.
Title III of the ADA incorporates the remedies which are contained in 42
U.S.C. §2000a-3(a).120 Monetary damages are not available to private litigants
under that section.121
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II.

THE OTHERWISE QUALIFIED VS. ESSENTIAL FUNCTION
DILEMMA

“I know what you're thinking about,' said Tweedledum: `but
it isn't so, nohow.'
`Contrariwise,' continued Tweedledee, `if it was so, it might
be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's
logic.'
`I was thinking,' Alice said very politely, `which is the best
way out of this wood: it's getting so dark. Would you tell me,
please?'
But the little men only looked at each other and grinned.”122

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that no “otherwise qualified
individual with a disability…shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance…”123 The United States Supreme Court in Southeast Community
College v. Davis124 noted that this mandate could not be followed literally
because it would prevent any institution from taking any adverse action against a
handicapped individual.125 The Court noted that the regulations promulgated by
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the Department of Health, Education and Welfare stated that a qualified
handicapped person is “[with] respect to post secondary and vocational
educational services, a handicapped person who meets the academic and technical
standards requisite to admission or participation in the [school’s] educational
program or activity.”126 The term “technical standards” refers to all nonacademic
admission criteria.127
The Supreme Court also noted that the implementing regulations
contained a statement in the appendix which expressed the Department’s intention
as follows: “under such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all the
qualifications for driving a bus except for sight could be said to be ‘otherwise
qualified’ for the job of driving. Clearly, such a result was not intended by
Congress.”128 The Court concluded, therefore, that “neither the language, purpose,
nor history of §504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation on
all recipients of federal funds.”129 In addition, the Court noted that “[s]ection 504
imposes no requirement upon an educational institution to lower or to effect
modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped individual.”130
Six years later, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Alexander v.
Choate.131 The Supreme Court acknowledged that its use of the term “affirmative
action” had led to much criticism for failing to differentiate between affirmative
action and reasonable accommodations. It noted that “the former is said to refer to
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a remedial policy for the victims of past discrimination, while the later relates to
the elimination of existing obstacles against the handicapped.”132 The Court in
Alexander concluded that “affirmative action” as used in Davis referred to
changes, adjustments or modifications which were “substantial” or which would
constitute “fundamental [alterations] in the nature of the program”133 when
compared to “those changes that would be reasonable accommodations.”134
Accordingly, the Court commented that:
The regulations implementing § 504 are consistent
with the view that reasonable adjustments in the
nature of the benefit offered must at times be made
to assure meaningful access. See, e.g. … 45 CFR §
84.44(a) (1984) (requiring certain modifications to
the regular academic programs of secondary
education institutions, such as changes in the length
of time permitted for the completion of degree
requirements, substitution of specific courses
required for the completion of degree requirements,
and adaptation of the manner in which specific
courses are conducted).135
The Supreme Court again examined the “otherwise qualified” question in
School Board of Nassau County v. Airline.136 In Airline, a school district fired a
teacher who had a relapse of active tuberculosis. The United States Court of
Appeals held that she was protected by Section 504.137 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that a person with a contagious disease can be
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handicapped within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
remanded the case to the District Court.138
The Supreme Court further held that to determine whether the teacher was
“otherwise qualified” the District Court:
will need to conduct an individualized inquiry and
make appropriate findings of fact. Such an inquiry
is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of
protecting handicapped individuals from
deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or
unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to
such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding
exposing others to significant health and safety
risks.139
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Zukle v. The
Regents of the University of California140 determined that Davis and Alexander
made it “clear that an educational institution is not required to make
fundamental or substantial modifications to its programs or standards; it need
only make reasonable ones.” 141 The Davis Court noted that a program receiving
federal financial assistance may violate Section 504 if it refuses to make
modifications to its educational program which would not entail undue financial
or administrative burden.142
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Nathanson v.
The Medical College of Pennsylvania143 noted that federal regulations required
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consideration of the following factors in order to determine whether an
accommodation would create an undue hardship:
(1) The overall size of the recipient’s program with
respect to the number of employees, number
and type of facilities, and size of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient’s operation, including
the composition and structure of the recipient’s
workforce; and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation
needed.144
The Nathanson Court stated this determination must be made on a case by case
basis.145 “[W]hat is reasonable in a particular situation may not be reasonable in a
different situation-even if the differences are relatively slight.”146
Such case-by-case evaluations have led courts to conclude that: an
optometry college need not modify or eliminate a program requirement which
mandates the ability to use certain clinical instruments for a student suffering
from retinitis pigmentosa, even though those requirements were put in place after
the student enrolled in the program;147 a law school need not eliminate the
graduation requirement of completion of the taxation course for a student
claiming computational and other learning disabilities;148 a medical school need
not modify its clinical training schedule by giving a student with a reading
disability eight weeks between clerkships in order to study and prepare for the
clinic rotations;149 a law school need not allow a disabled student to take a part144
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time course load where the school only offered a full-time program, even though
the American Bar Association authorizes law schools to have part-time programs
for the study of law;150 a medical school was not required to allow a dyslexic
student to provide supplemental oral answers to multiple choice tests;151 a high
school athletic association was not required to waive its age limitations for
participation in sports programs for a learning disabled student;152 a university
was not required to waive its foreign language requirement for students with
learning disabilities;153 a medical school did not discriminate against a student
with an obsessive-compulsive disorder who was dismissed after failing his
psychiatry clinic twice;154 a university need not modify its nursing program’s
clinical requirements for a student suffering from a non-typical pregnancy;155 a
college did not discriminate against a learning disabled Physicians Assistant
student after granting and then withdrawing permission for the student to take his
examinations orally;156 a law school need not give a student oral examinations or
allow the student to enroll on a part-time basis;157 a medical school need not
renew the faculty appointment of a visually impaired physician and did not need
to offer the physician a part-time appointment;158 a law school need not lower its
2.0 minimum grade point average standard to accommodate a student with a
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central nervous system metabolic disorder;159 a law school need not waive
minimum grade point average requirements for a recovered alcoholic;160 a law
school did not discriminate by dismissing and failing to readmit a student
suffering from post traumatic stress disorder who received more than nine credit
hours of grades below a C- in violation of the school academic standards;161 and a
law school did not discriminate against a visually impaired law student by
dismissing her after she failed to meet its 2.0 academic standard for continuation
in its program.162
Conversely, a summary judgment in favor of a medical school was
reversed on appeal where the school failed to give extra time between clinical
rotations and then dismissed a student with a verbal processing disorder who had
repeated failed various clinical programs;163 a university was denied summary
judgment where it dismissed a pastoral psychology student who was hospitalized
with clinical depression;164 a state board of bar examiners was ordered to allow a
dyslexic applicant to take the bar examination using twice the normal time, the
use of a computer, permission to circle multiple choice examination questions in
the examination booklet and the use of examinations with enlarged print;165 and a
testing agency was ordered to give a test taker who suffered from an “expressive
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writing disorder” fifty percent additional time and a quiet room in which to take
the Law School Admissions Test.166
An in depth reading of the above decisions demonstrates that both
institutions and the courts have struggled while attempting to resolve the
“otherwise qualified vs. essential functions dilemma”. Some courts have issued
conflicting decisions within the same year in almost identical cases.167 The
distinction, if any, in the outcome in these cases appears to be the extent to which
the individual institutions have documented their efforts to justify what
constituted “fundamental” program requirements as well as to justify the extent to
which “reasonable” accommodations could be granted without changing the
fundamental nature of their academic programs. To the extent that institutions
could do so, the courts appear willing to defer to academic decision makers.

III.

ACADEMIC DEFERENCE AND ITS LIMITS

“Everything was happening so oddly that she didn't feel a
bit surprised at finding the Red Queen and the White Queen
sitting close to her, one on each side: she would have like
very much to ask them how they came there, but she feared
it would not be quite civil. However, there would be no
166
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harm, she thought, in asking if the game was over. `Please,
would you tell me -- ' she began, looking timidly at the Red
Queen.
`Speak when you're spoken to!' The Queen sharply
interrupted her.”168

The United States Supreme Court in Board of Curators of the University
of Missouri v. Horowitz,169 addressed the issue of deference to academic decision
makers in the case of a student who had been dismissed from medical school for
failure to meet the school’s academic requirements in her clinical education
program. Horowitz alleged that she was dismissed without being afforded
procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.170 While the case does not concern a claim under Section 504
or under the ADA, it is nevertheless instructive of the Supreme Court’s evolving
deference to academic decision makers.
In Horowitz, the Supreme Court noted that the student did not have a
recognized property right in her medical school education.171 It deferred a
decision concerning whether she had a liberty interest in continuing her medical
education.172 Instead, without deciding that such an interest existed, the Court
concluded that she had been afforded the appropriate due process in her
dismissal.173
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In reaching this decision, the Court addressed the role of the courts in the
academic decision making process. The Court noted that whether a student is
making sufficient academic progress or whether the student should be dismissed
from an academic program is similar to the “decision of an individual professor as
to the proper grade for a student in his course. The determination whether to
dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of
cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of
judicial or administrative decision making.”174
The Court “decline[d] to further enlarge the judicial presence in the
academic community and thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of
the faculty-student relationship”175 and concluded that “[c]ourts are particularly
ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance.”176
The Supreme Court in Southeast Community College v. Davis177
addressed the issue of whether Section 504 required an academic institution to
modify its educational program to admit a handicapped student. Ms. Davis
suffered from a severe hearing loss which required her to read lips in order to
understand what people were saying. The nursing program at Southeast
Community College refused to admit her due to her inability to understand verbal
communication. It also refused her request to modify the nursing program to
eliminate the clinical portion of her training.178
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Without directly addressing the issue of deference to academic decisions,
the Court held that the college was not required to make fundamental
modifications in it nursing program to accommodate Ms. Davis.179 The Court
noted that “Southeast’s program, structured to train persons who will be able to
perform all normal roles of a registered nurse, represents a legitimate academic
policy.”180 The Court stated that Section 504 does not impose an obligation on
colleges to “lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to
accommodate a handicapped person.”181 Finally, the Court noted that: “there was
no violation of §504 when Southeast concluded that respondent did not qualify
for admission to its program.”(emphasis added)182 Thus the Court, in effect,
deferred to the college’s academic decision making concerning admission to its
nursing program.
The Supreme Court revisited the academic deference issue in Regents of
the University of Michigan v. Ewing.183 Ewing had been admitted to the
University’s Inteflex program which allowed graduation from college and
medical school in six years.184 Ewing faced immediate difficulty with the program
and had to repeat several courses.185 Eventually, Ewing managed to complete the
first four years of the program and took the National Board of Medical Examiners
Part I Test (NMBE Part I), passage of which was essential to continuing in the
clinical portion of the program. Ewing failed the NBME Part I, obtaining the
179
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lowest grade in the history of the Inteflex program at the University of
Michigan.186 The University dismissed Ewing from the program and refused to
readmit him or to let him retake the NBME Part I test.187
Ewing filed suit alleging various causes of action including a violation of
his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.188 The
District Court conducted a trial and found no violation of Ewing’s due process
rights.189 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
District Court’s judgment, found a constitutional violation and ordered the
University to allow Ewing to retake the NBME Part I test and to reinstate him if
he passed the test.190 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
decision of the Sixth Circuit.191
In its decision, the Supreme Court again examined the issue of deference
to academic decision makers. The Supreme Court stated that: “[w]hen judges are
asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one,
they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly,
they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did
not actually exercise professional judgment.192
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The Supreme Court also noted that it was concerned about treading on the
academic freedom safeguards contained in the First Amendment.193 It stated that:
“[d]iscretion to determine, on academic grounds, who may be admitted to study,
has been described as one of the ‘four essential academic freedoms’ of a
university.”194
In Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine,195 (hereafter “Wynne
I”) the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the extent
to which a medical school must alter its program of instruction to provide
reasonable accommodations to a learning disabled student. Wynne was allowed to
enter Tufts Medical School under its affirmative action program for minority
applicants even though his Medical College Aptitude Test (MCAT) score and
undergraduate grade point average were lower than most Tufts students.196 During
his first year in school he failed eight of his fifteen courses.197 He was dismissed
from the program but was allowed to reenter the following fall.198
Prior to reentering the school, Wynne underwent neuropsychological
testing which revealed cognitive difficulties which suggested dyslexia.199 When
he reentered medical school he was provided accommodations which included
counseling, tutors, note-takers and taped lectures.200 Nevertheless, Wynne failed
two courses his second year, Pharmacology and Biochemistry. He was allowed to
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retake these exams and passed Pharmacology but again failed Biochemistry.201 He
was again dismissed from medical school.202
Wynne filed suit alleging a violation of Section 504 due to Tufts’ failure
to allow him to take oral final exams.203 The District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Tufts and Wynne appealed.204 A panel of the First Circuit
reversed stating that on the record below Tufts had failed to show that it was
incapable of altering its program to accommodate Wynne’s disability.205
The First Circuit granted rehearing in banc and examined the nature of the
obligations of educational institutions under Section 504.206 The Court noted that
Ewing held that when courts review academic decisions they are required to
“show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.”207 Furthermore,
when courts review the “otherwise qualified-reasonable accommodations”
requirement of Section 504, they must show the proper deference to academic
decisions with two qualifications:
First, as we have noted, there is a real obligation on
the academic institution to seek suitable means of
reasonably accommodating a handicapped person
and to submit a factual record indicating that it
conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation.
Second, the Ewing formulation, hinging judicial
override on "a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms," is not necessarily a helpful test in
assessing whether professional judgment has been
exercised in exploring reasonable alternatives for
accommodating a handicapped person.208
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Accordingly, the Court looked to an analysis similar to the process of
determining the applicability of qualified immunity for governmental decision
makers.209 The Court created the following test for use in reviewing academic
decisions:
If the institution submits undisputed facts
demonstrating that the relevant officials within the
institution considered alternative means, their
feasibility, cost and effect on the academic program,
and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion that
the available alternatives would result either in
lowering academic standards or requiring
substantial program alteration, the court could rule
as a matter of law that the institution had met its
duty of seeking reasonable accommodation.210
The Court remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of
whether Tufts met its burden concerning the denial of the requested
accommodation.211 On remand the District Court again granted Tufts motion for
summary judgment and Wynne appealed to the First Circuit. (Wynne II)212
The First Circuit, on appeal, concluded that it would not second guess the
academic decision made by the Tufts faculty. “The point is not whether a medical
school is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in making program-related decisions. Such absolutes
rarely apply in the context of subjective decision making, particularly in a
scholastic setting. The point is that Tufts, after undertaking a diligent assessment
of the available options, felt itself obliged to make ‘a professional, academic
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judgment that [a] reasonable accommodation [was] simply not available.’"213
Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Tufts.214
Other courts have added important caveats to the above standards. The
Third Circuit implied that stringent admission standards may be entitled to more
deference if they were designed to “protect public health and safety, a concern
that has been given considerable deference by the courts.”215 Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit in Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry noted that: “surely the law
does not require that a handicapped person be accommodated by waiver of a
requirement when his failure to meet the requirements poses potential danger to
the public.”216
The Eighth Circuit refused to decide whether academic institutions, like
employers, are required under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with
students to determine whether reasonable accommodations can be found for their
disability.217
The Fourth Circuit noted that a university’s academic decisions were
entitled to less deference and were reviewable by courts where the university
determined that a student was entitled to extra time on examinations but expelled
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the student from school based, in part, on grades which were obtained by the
student before the accommodation was granted.218
The Ninth Circuit agreed that “a court’s duty is to first find the basic facts,
giving due deference to the school, and then to evaluate whether those facts add
up to a professional, academic judgment that reasonable accommodation is not
available.”219 However, the Court cautioned that: “extending deference to
academic institutions must not impede our obligation to enforce the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. Thus we must be careful not to allow academic decisions to
disguise truly discriminatory intent.”220
Seven months later, the same court in a strikingly similar case, noted that:
“[w]e must insure that educational institutions are not ‘disguising truly
discriminatory requirements’ as an academic decision; to this end, ‘the
educational institution has a real obligation…to seek suitable means of reasonably
accommodating a handicapped person and to submit a factual record indicating
that it conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation.’”221 The Court held
that:
Subsumed within this standard is the institution's
duty to make itself aware of the nature of the
student's disability; to explore alternatives for
accommodating the student; and to exercise
professional judgment in deciding whether the
modifications under consideration would give the
student the opportunity to complete the program
without fundamentally or substantially modifying
the school's standards.222
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To this end, the Court concluded that institutions need to: “submit
undisputed facts showing that relevant officials considered alternative means,
their feasibility, [and] cost and effect on the academic program” and courts should
not grant deference to academic decisions “when institutions present no evidence
regarding who took part in the decisions” and stated that “finding simple
conclusory averments of [the] head of institution[s] [is] insufficient to support [a]
deferential standard of review.”223
Finally, the Fifth Circuit determined that while courts must defer to
academic decisions which are devoid of evidence of malice or ill-will, courts do
not need to give deference to the American Bar Association standard for
accrediting law schools when a court considers what accommodations are
reasonable and required under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.224
Higher education institutions appear to have learned the lessons of these
cases. The primary lesson is that the courts will not interfere with academic
operations as long as institutions can document that a deliberative process was
undertaken to determine whether a program requirement was truly “fundamental.”
As long as such a deliberative process was in place, the courts will not second
guess academic decision makers. In other words, the courts will not try to decide
whether the institutions decisions were “right or wrong”.
Unfortunately, this excessive deferral to academic decision makers can
sometimes result in the courts not enforcing the mandates of Congress to
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eliminate discrimination in academic programs where reasonable
accommodations could allow disabled students to successfully compete in and
complete academic programs. The courts must be vigilant to ensure that
explanations offered by academic institutions were not created in hindsight to
justify their discrimination against disabled students but are truly reflective of
important fundamental program requirements which cannot be altered to provide
reasonable accommodation.

IV.

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: ALICE’S JOURNIES THROUGH
THE WORLD OF ACADEMIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND THE
STRANGE CREATURES SHE MET.
“Where do you come from?' said the Red Queen. `And
where are you going? Look up, speak nicely, and don't
twiddle your fingers all the time.'
Alice attended to all these directions, and explained, as well
as she could, that she had lost her way.
`I don't know what you mean by YOUR way,' said the
Queen: `all the ways about here belong to ME -- but why
did you come out here at all?' she added in a kinder tone.
`Curtsey while you`re thinking what to say, it saves
time.'”225
The Red Queen
Carlin v. Trustees of Boston University226
225
226
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Marie Carlin entered Boston University’s Doctor of Philosophy program
in Pastoral Psychology in September 1987. The program consisted of four
semesters of academic general research followed by a two-year clinical
component.227 Ms. Carlin complete the first two years of the program and was
awarded a fellowship from Boston University to attend Danielson Institute for
Pastoral Counseling to complete the two year clinical portion of the doctoral
program.228 She completed the first year of the fellowship and, in May 1989,
received a certificate stating that she had successfully completed the first year
clinical requirement.229
Throughout her enrollment in the doctoral program, Ms. Carlin had been
suffering from depression. Her condition worsened in the spring of 1989 and she
requested and was granted a leave of absence from Boston University.230 In April
1990, her condition deteriorated to the point where she was admitted to a
psychiatric hospital where she remained under treatment until February 1991. She
requested and was granted an extension of her leave of absence.231
Ms. Carlin wrote to her academic advisor in June 1991, informing him that
she was ready to return to the doctoral program. She sent copies of the letter to the
Dean of Boston University and to the Director of the Danielson Institute.232 She
received a response in August indicating that the faculty had decided to not
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readmit her into the program.233 Ms. Carlin responded by filing suit in the United
States District Court alleging that the University had violated Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.234
Boston University filed a Motion for Summary Judgment stating that the
decision to terminate Ms. Carlin’s participation in the program was based on the
academic determination of the faculty which was entitled to deference by the
Court.235 The Court noted that it was required to defer to the institution’s decision:
“if there is evidence that the University made a ‘professional academic judgment
that [a] reasonable accommodation [was] simply not available.’”236
Ms Carlin responded to the University’s motion by submitting evidence
that:
(1)

there was no documentation of lack of ability until after she
took an approved leave of absence;

(2)

her clinical supervisor wrote a letter stating that she
demonstrated good clinical skills;

(3)

she received a certificate stating that she had successfully
completed the first year clinical program;

(4)

she was not terminated at the end of the first clinical year but
was allowed to go on a leave of absence;
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(5)

she was not terminated from the program until she attempted to
return from an approved leave of absence after her discharge
from the psychiatric hospital; and

(6)

her academic supervisor wrote a letter stating that the reason
for her termination from the program was: “her history of
serious mental health problems.”237

The Court denied the University’s motion for summary judgment stating
that Ms. Carlin presented “significant probative evidence of pretext.”238
The Court noted:
The evidence set forth above suggests that the
reason articulated by defendants for terminating
plaintiff was untrue and that the defendants were in
fact motivated by plaintiff's mental illness and not
her lack of aptitude in its decision to terminate her
from the program. Boston University has absolute
authority to render an academic judgment, but that
decision must be a genuine one.239

Humpty Dumpty
Gluckenerger v. Boston University240

Boston University is one of the largest private universities in the country.
Its liberal arts curriculum has long required that students complete four semesters
237
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of foreign language as a condition for graduation.241 The University was also
recognized, prior to 1995, as being among the leading academic institutions in
proactively addressing the needs of its learning disabled students. The University
had created the Learning Disabilities Support Services (“LDSS”) staffed by
trained professionals to evaluate and provide accommodations for students. It was
often describes as a “model program.”242
Prior to 1995, LDSS provided accommodations to learning disabled
students which included, note-takers, tape-recorded text books, extra time on final
exams and course substitutions, including alternate courses in lieu of the
University’s foreign language requirement.243 LDSS conferred with the heads of
various academic departments at the College of Liberal Arts and had developed
an approved list of courses to substitute for the foreign language curriculum for
learning disabled students. LDSS had not, however, sought the approval of the
course substitutions from the President, Provost or central administration at
Boston University.244
In the spring of 1995, Boston University’s then Provost and later
President, Jon Westling, discovered that LDSS had been allowing learning
disabled students to substitute non-language courses in place of the foreign
language requirement. Westing had no graduate degrees of any kind and no
formal academic training in any aspect of learning disabilities.245
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Westling was, in the words of the Court, “chagrined” to make this
discovery.246 Westling told his assistant, Craig Klafter to conduct an investigation.
Klafter confronted LDSS Director, Loring Brickerhoff and demanded proof that
learning disabilities prevented students from successfully completing foreign
language courses. Brickerhoff referred Klafter to Brickerhoff’s book on the
subject.247 Klafter, who had a Ph. D. in Modern History but no experience in the
area of learning disabilities, reported to Westling that there was “no scientific
proof that the existence of a learning disability prevents the successful study of
...[a] foreign language.”248
Westling informed Norman Johnson, Vice-President and Dean of
Students, that Boston University was to “cease granting course substitutions
effective immediately.”249 Westling also ordered that all accommodation letters
generated by LDSS were to be forwarded to his office for approval before they
were sent to students or faculty. Westling made this decision without consulting
any experts or members of the faculty concerning the importance of the foreign
language requirement in a liberal arts curriculum.250 The Court’s opinion stated
that the course substitution issue had become “a bee in his academic bonnet.”251
The Court noted that: “Westling had decided to become personally involved with
the accommodation evaluation process, even though he had no expertise or
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experience in diagnosing learning disabilities or in fashioning appropriate
remedies.”252
During the time Westling became involved in this process, he “began
delivering speeches denouncing the zealous advocacy of the learning disability
movement.”253 He accused learning disability advocates of “fashioning fugitive
impairments that are not supported in the scientific or medical literature.”254 The
dominant theme in his speeches was that the movement was: “a great mortuary
for the ethics of hard work, individual responsibility, and pursuit of
excellence.”255 In July 1995, he delivered a speech in which he described how a
shy woman approached him on the first day of class and presented a letter
containing a diagnosis of learning disability and requesting the accommodation of
extra time on exams, copies of lecture notes, a separate exam room and that,
should she fall asleep in class, he should be “particularly concerned to fill her in
on any material she missed while dozing.”256 He named this student “Somnolent
Samantha.”257
During the trial before the District Court, Westling admitted he had
fabricated Samantha. He further admitted that: “not only that such a student never
existed, but that his description of her did not even represent a prototype of the
learning-disabled students he had encountered.”258
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The Court noted that by the fall 1995 semester, Boston University was at a
“bureaucratic impasse.”259 Brickerhoff at LDSS was ignoring Westling’s order
and was continuing to grant accommodations without Westling’s approval. “Irate
that his mandates were being disregarded, Westling directly ordered that all
accommodations letters that LDSS had prepared but that had not yet been picked
up by the affected students be delivered to his office.”260 Westling and his office
staff then undertook to review all the approved accommodations even though
neither Westling nor his staff had any training in the field.261 Westling then
ordered Brickerhoff to deny the majority of the requests and to immediately
implement changes in the LDSS procedures demanded by Westling.262
On December 4, 1995 Brickerhoff sent a letter to all Boston University
students who were receiving accommodations and informed them that they
needed to renew their documentation and resubmit their request for
accommodations if their previous diagnosis was more than three years old. Such
documentation needed to contain a report by a licensed psychologist, psychiatrist
or physician.263
The result, as described by the Court in its opinion was “chaos.”264In early
1996, Brickerhoff and nearly all of his staff at LDSS resigned.265 Westling hired
an adjunct law professor to take over the LDSS office. That individual undertook
to review all the accommodation files even though “the files were in complete
259
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disarray and neither he nor any other newly hired DS staff members had any
expertise in diagnosing learning disabilities or in fashioning appropriate
remedies.”266 The new LDSS staff was “hand-picked” by Westling and Zafft, the
new Coordinator of Disability Services, had expressed to Westling her belief that
“there is too much abuse in the granting of accommodations prior to her
consideration for the job.”267 All LDSS decisions still had to go to Westling’s
office for final approval.268
In the midst of this “chaos,” Elizabeth Gluckenberger and several other
Boston University students who had diagnosed learning disabilities filed suit in
the United States District Court alleging violations of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, Title III of the ADA and various state law breach of contract
claims.269 The Court conducted a two week trial and held that Boston University
had violated the law in regard to certain claims. It ordered money damages
awarded to the students for Boston University’s change in its disability evaluation
process and enjoined most of the changes.270
However, on the foreign language course substitution issue, the Court
noted that it was required to give deference to the academic decision makers.271
The Court stated that a university can refuse to alter its programs to accommodate
disabled students if it “undertakes a diligent assessment of the available options
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and makes a professional academic judgment that reasonable accommodation is
simply not available.”272
The Court further noted that Westling’s “ipse dixit” was not sufficient to
meet this burden.273 The court stated that:
Westling’s reliance on discriminatory stereotypes,
together with his failure to consider carefully the
effect of course substitutions on BU’s liberal arts
programs and to consult with academics and experts
in learning disabilities, constitutes a failure of BU’s
obligation to make a rational judgment that course
substitutions would fundamentally alter the course
of study.274
The Court ordered Boston University to conduct, within thirty days: “a
deliberative process for considering whether modification of its degree
requirement in foreign language would fundamentally alter the nature of the
liberal arts program.”275
Complying with the Court’s order, the University decided to use the
Dean’s Advisory Committee to consider the question of whether the foreign
language requirement was a fundamental component of the University’s liberal
arts curriculum.276 The committee was composed of eleven members of the
faculty of the Liberal Arts College.277 The committee met on seven occasions
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which were closed to the public. No notes were taken of the committee’s
deliberation until ordered to do so by the Court.278
The committee completed its report on December 2, 1997 which
concluded that “the foreign language requirement is fundamental to the nature of
the liberal arts degree at Boston University.”279
In further proceedings, the Court discussed its obligation of deference to
the academic decision making process. It noted that: “[t]he point is not whether a
[university] is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in making program-related decisions. Such
absolutes rarely apply in the context of subjective decision making, particularly in
a scholastic setting.”280 The Court determined that it must give due deference to
the basic facts which included: “(1) an indication of who took part in the decision
[and] when it was made; (2) a discussion of the unique qualities of the foreign
language requirement as it now stands; and (3) a consideration of the possible
alternatives to the requirements.”281
The Court noted that the committee had “rallied around” the foreign
language requirement.282 One committee member believed it was “important to be
immersed in ancient Greek and Latin to understand Greek and Roman culture.”283
Another: “waxed that someone who can read in French would realize that
Madame Bovary dies in the imperfect tense, something that we don’t have in the
English language, and it makes for a very different understanding of the novel.”284
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The plaintiffs countered that the University’s policy marked a substantial
deviation from accepted academic norms. Their evidence showed that the
majority of liberal arts colleges, including Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia,
Dartmouth, Cornell and Brown either do not require a foreign language, or waive
the requirement for learning disabled students.285 Furthermore, the plaintiffs
asserted that a requirement of four semesters of foreign language is not sufficient
for most students to read major works of foreign literature, “thus debunking the
Madame Bovary line of argument as involving an imperfect logic, not an
imperfect tense.”286
Finally, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of the Chair of the Language
and Foreign Studies Department at American University who testified that she
and other academics: “strongly disagreed with BU’s conclusions and labeled them
as ‘trite’, ‘idealistic’ or ‘clichés.’”287
The Court, however, determined that its role was not to “conduct a headcount” of what was done at other universities, the appropriate question being
whether the University’s decision is “rationally justified rather than the only
possible conclusion it could have reached.”288 In conclusion, the Court held that
the foreign language requirement was: “rationally justified and represents a
professional judgment with which the Court should not interfere.”289
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`Now! Now!' cried the Queen. `Faster! Faster!' And they went so fast that
at last they seemed to skim through the air, hardly touching the ground
with their feet, till suddenly, just as Alice was getting quite exhausted,
they stopped, and she found herself sitting on the ground, breathless and
giddy.
The Queen propped her up against a tree, and said kindly, `You may rest a
little now.'
Alice looked round her in great surprise. `Why, I do believe we've been
under this tree the whole time! Everything's just as it was!'
`Of course it is,' said the Queen, `what would you have it?'
`Well, in OUR country,' said Alice, still panting a little, `you'd generally
get to somewhere else -- if you ran very fast for a long time, as we've been
doing.'
`A slow sort of country!' said the Queen. `Now, HERE, you see, it takes
all the running YOU can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get
somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!' 290

Like Alice, many learning disabled students find that no matter how hard they
attempt to run through the bureaucratic accommodations chess board that they wind up in
the same place. They are trapped in a country ruled by a Red Queen; a country in which
they must run twice as fast as is humanly possible if they expect to get anywhere.

Humpty Dumpty also survives today in the realm of academia. Decisions made by
university faculties concerning participation of learning disabled students in academic
programs are granted deference by the courts provided the institutions show that they
engaged in a reasoned decision making process concerning whether requested academic
accommodations would fundamentally alter the nature of the program. Courts are
unwilling to consider whether the academic decisions are right or wrong as the courts will
290
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not second guess those decisions provided that the institutions can show something more
that an “ipse dixit” process.
Today’s University President Dumpty has slightly amended his statement to:
“words mean just what I, and the reasoned decision of my hand appointed faculty
committee, choose them to mean, neither more or less.” In today’s judicial environment
such a response will ensure the insulation of his academic domain from the intrusive
mandates of the courts. That is, until the White Knight rescues Alice from the Looking
Glass World.
EPILOGUE291

“Of all the strange things that Alice saw in her journey Through
The Looking-Glass, this was the one that she always remembered most
clearly. Years afterwards she could bring the whole scene back again, as if
it had been only yesterday -- the mild blue eyes and kindly smile of the
Knight -- the setting sun gleaming through his hair, and shining on his
armour in a blaze of light that quite dazzled her -- the horse quietly
moving about, with the reins hanging loose on his neck, cropping the grass
at her feet -- and the black shadows of the forest behind -- all this she took
in like a picture, as, with one hand shading her eyes, she leant against a
green, watching the strange pair, and listening, in a half dream, to the
melancholy music of the song.”292
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